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ClmvmTn LAw-OBscE=lr-TBE Nmam FoR LEiSLATrV BEFoEm
I deplore . . . the patred state into which our newspapers have
passed, and the malegnity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those
who write them.... These odures are rapidly depraving the public taste.
It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty depends
in the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being
lost.1
The law of obscenity is pathological. It neither lends an ear to
reason, nor exhibits any sort of pragmatic approach. There has been
much anti-obscenity legislation in the United States. However, the
standards set must be ever changing, since the problem of obscenity
is subjective. Thus, loss of predictability, increasing censorship, and
inherent subjectivity are unsettling to the vast communication industry.
Kentucky has been plagued, since the legislature has not revised its
statutes concerning obscenity to meet the times.2 Consequently, the
Kentucky Crime Commission has proposed a new obscenity statute.
The purpose of this comment will be to give the history of
obscenity via Supreme Court decisions; to discuss the purposes of the
Model Penal Code; to examine pertinent provisions of Kentucky's
proposed code; and to recommend what should and should not be in-
cluded in an obscenity statue. The law has recently changed providing
ample reason for this writer, as well as the Kentucky Legislature, to
give a realistic re-analysis to the problem of obscenity.
I own, of our Protestant laws I am jealous
And long as Cod spares me will always remain
That once having taken men's rights or umbrellas,
We ne'er should consent to restore them againA
The classical generation gave us our words for pornography and
obscenity. 5 The earliest reported case is that of The King v. Sir Charles
Sedley.
1 THoMAs JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (Saul K. Padover ed. 1939).
2 They were rewritten in 1966 to conform to recent Supreme Court decisions
on first amendment freedoms. However, as will be shown in this paper, the
standard for obscenity is ever changing and has undergone drastic change since
1966.
a 1 KENTucKY C~uME COMMISSiON, OUTLINE FoR PRoposED CRmimAL LAw
REVSION § 3101-20 (1968). The proposed statute on obscenity is divided into
five sections: § 3101, Definitions; § 3105, Promoting Pornographic Materials; §
3110, Promoting Lascivious Materials for Minors; § 3115, Intent to Discriminate:
Prima facie Proof; and § 3120, Displaying Indecent Materials.
4 Moore, Growth of Law.
5 Porne and graphum come from Greek, meaning literally "writing about
whores," whereas obscenity comes from the Latin words for "filthy" or "repulsive."
However they were not applied exclusively to sexual expression and carried no
moral stigma. Gilman, There's a Wave of Pornography, Obscene Sexual Expression,
N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 8, 1968, § 6, at 36.
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He was fined 2,000 mark, committed without bail for a week, and
banned to his good behavior for a year, on his confession of information
against him, for shewing himself naked in a balcony, throwing down
bottles (pist in) and armes among the people in Covent Gardens, contra
pacem and to the scandal of the Jovernment.6
As early as 1727 common law held that obscene printing was
punishable in England.7 The common law rule was also extensively
used as a basis for prosecution in the United States.8 However several
states enacted statutes making the writing or printing of obscene
books or pamphlets punishable crimes. 9
Our earliest test for obscenity comes from the English courts in
1868 in the case of Regina v. Hicklin.10 A book was considered obscene
if it contained any passages that tended to arouse libidinous thoughts
in those persons "most susceptible" to such influence.11 This test was
applied in our courts in 1879 in United States v. Bennett.'2 This test
allowed passages to be read out of context, and allowed no weight to
literary, scientific, or other value of the work in question. Case law
followed the Hicklin rule consistently.13 This was distinctly illustrated
when in 1930 a Massachusetts court ruled Theodore Dreiser's An
American Tragedy obscene because of objectional passages.
14
However, there were cases during this time that began to reject
the Hicklin test.15 The absurdity of the test was that by it even the
Bible could be declared obscene.:" Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Kennedy, applied the Hicklin test but expressed his dis-
content with allowing our literature to be graded by the standards of
G1 Keeble 620 (K.B. 1663).
7 Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788 (1727). For the historical development of the law
of obscenity, see ST. JOHN STEVAS, OnscEmTrrY AND =rE LAw (1956).
8 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91, 7 Am. Dec. 632 (Pa. 1815).
9 Acts of 1711-12, C.I. Charter of The Province of the Mass. Bay 172 (1759);
An Act to Promote Literature, Act of April 29, 1786, C. Liv., § IV, 1 Laws of
N.Y. 321 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); Acts of General Assembly of Va. 286
(1794).
103 Q.B. 360 (1868). Lord Cockburns said, "I think the test of obscenity is
this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall."
" Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Consti.
tution, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289, 338-39 (1961).
1224 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571) (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
13 United States v. Rosen, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); Commonwealth v. McCance,
164 Mass. 162, 41 N.E. 133 (1895); People v. Muhler, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884).
14 Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
15 The New York Supreme Court held Paynes' edition of the Arabian Nights,
Fielding's Tom Jones, Rousseau's Confessions, The Works of Rabelais, Ovid's Art
of Love, the Decameron and Heptameron to be salable and not obscene. In re
Worthington, 30 N.Y.S. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
16Halsey v. New York Socy, 284 N.Y. 1, 4, 136 N.E. 219, 220 (1922);
State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ohio 1948).
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the dullest most susceptible, reader in the community.17 Beginning in
the 1930's the Hicklin rule encountered further resistence. The first to
be excluded from it were medical and other serious texts offering sex
information."8
Judge Learned Hand's discontentment became law in United
States v. One Book called "Ulysses."19 Judge Woolsey defined obscenity
as "tending to stir the sex impulses or to lend to sexually impure and
lustful thoughts."20 He claimed the book must be judged by its
effects on reasonable men rather than on those most susceptible. In
affirming the decision, Judge Augustus N. Hand wrote:
We believe that the proper test of whether a given book is obscene
is its dominant effect. In applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable
parts to the theme, the established reputation of the work in the
estimation of approved critics, if the book is modem and the verdict
of the past, if it is ancient are persuasive pieces of evidence. 2'
In 1936 Judge Learned Hand specifically stated that Ulysses had over-
ruled the Hicklin test.22 This new test also began to be considered by
state courts.
However, the Supreme Court did not actually become involved
with obscenity litigation until 1956, when it decided Roth v. United
States.23 Prior to this case there was dictum, but no direct holding by
the Supreme Court that obscenity is not protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.2 4 The Court decided that the "dispositive
question is whether obscenity is within the area of protected speech
and press."25 The Court said obscenity was not protected;26 then
proceeded to announce the test:
[W]hether . . . to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.27
17 "[I]t would reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library
in the supposed interest of the salacious few and forbid all which might corrupt
the most corruptible." 207 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
1-8Walker v. Popenue, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. One
Book Entitled "Contraception," 57 F.2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v.
one Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.2d 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1931);
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
19 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
20 5 F. Supp. at 184.
2172 F.2d at 708.
22 United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
23354 U.S. 476 (1956).24 See, e.g., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinski
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931).





Justices Black and Douglas joined in a dissenting opinion expressing
the view that all obscenity censorship is unconstitutional unless the
censored material satisfies the clear and present danger test.
28
After this decision it was felt that the Court was adopting a
standard in favor of censorship.29 However, in 1957 the Court handed
down four per curiam decisions30 which reversed lower court decisions
upholding censorship. The Roth case did no more than open up a
Pandora's Box in obscenity regulation. This can be seen from the
simple fact that since the Roth decision, the law of obscenity has
produced five separate and contradictory tests: one anti-Roth test
and four Roth tests.
1. All material is constitutionally protected, except where it can be shown
to be so brigaded with illegal action that it constitutes a clear and
present danger to significant social interests. Justices Black and
Douglas.
2. All material is constitutionally protected at both the federal and state
level except hard-core pornography. Mr. Justice Stewart.
3. All material is constitutionally protected at the federal level except
hard-core pornography; material may be suppressed at the state level
if reasonable evidence supports a finding that it is salacious and
prurient. Mr. Justice Harlan.
4. Material may be suppressed both by the federal and state governments
when prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and utter lack of social
value coalesce; in addition, in close cases evidence that the producer
or distributer commercially exploited the material so as to emphasize
its pruriency which draws constitutional protection from other-
wise protected material. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
and Fortas.
5. Material may be suppressed if its dominant appeal taken is to prurient
interest. Justices Clark and White. 31
In the decade between Roth and Ginzberg v. United States,3 2 the
Supreme Court did not uphold a single finding of obscenity. In twelve
cases it overturned judgments against nearly two hundred items and
lower courts followed suit. Consequently the Court was criticized for
its permissiveness. The result was Ginzburg and Memoirs v. Mas-
sachusetts.3  These cases established the contextual obscenity, or con-
duct approach, where the dominant issue is the conduct of the de-
28"The test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem
tomorrow." Id. at 514 (dissenting opinion).29 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Consti-
tutional Standard, 45 Mnw. L. REv. 18, 31-32 (1960).30 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957);
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
31Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 7,
56-57.
32383 U.S. 463 (1966).
33 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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fendant and circumstances of the sale or publication, not the content
of the book.
The most important step in the development of the theory of con-
textual obscenity came in Ginzburg where the majority adopted the
"pandering" theory. The majority defined pandering as "the business
of purveying textual or graphic material openly advertised to appeal
to the erotic interest of their customers."34
These contextual cases have best been summarized as follows:
In summary, Ginzburg and the related contextual cases are ill-starred
and constitutionally dubious grants of power to the states and the federal
government to punish the distribution of undistinguished literature re-
lating to sex. It is a frantic effort to re-balance the scales in favor of the
censors after a decade of tipping them in favor of free expression-
which favored the "panderers." It is an effort to alleviate the frustration
of the states occasioned by the first amendment, by an alternative
route, a back door to censorship by imprisoning the merchants of sex
literature.3 5
After Ginzburg the Court agreed to hear Redrup v. New York-,36 a
composite of three state obscenity convictions.37 The Court said, "We
have concluded in short, that the distribution of the publications in
each of these cases is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
from governmental suppression whether criminal or civil."38 The
Court expounded on the views of the different judges concerning
obscenity during the past decade39 and concluded, "Whichever of
34 The opinion held that "in close cases evidence of pandering may be pro-
bative with respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the
Roth test." 383 U.S. at 467.
35 Note, The Substantive Law of Obscenity: An Adventure in Quicksand, 13
N.Y.L.F. 81, 121 (1967).
36 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
3 7
Tbe other two cases were Austin v. Kentucky, and Gent v. Arkansas, 386
U.S. 767 (1967).
38386 U.S. at 770.
39 The Court reviewed the standards which have been invoked to govern
state conduct in regulating pornography:
Two members of the court have consistently adhered to the view
that a state is utterly without power to suppress, control, or punish the
distribution of any writings or pictures upon the ground of their obscenity.
See Ginzburg v. United States, 883 U.S. 463, 476, 482 (dissenting
opinions); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (concurring opinions);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (dissenting opinion).
A third has held to the opinion that a state's power in this area is
narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class of material.
See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 479 (dissenting opinion).
See also Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT.
Rv. 7, 69-77.
Others have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding that a
state may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary material
as obscene unless (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
(Continued on next page)
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these constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us,
it is clear that the judgments cannot stand."40
After Redrup the Court reversed thirteen obscenity convictions
without opinion.
41
Perhaps most significant in this highly subjective area, was the
indication that a liberal majority is emerging. The Court's three
strongest foes of obscenity censorship, Justices Black, Douglas, and
Stewart, were joined by Justices Fortas and White in all thirteen re-
versals. Justice Clark dissented in ten cases, the Chief Justice in eight,
Justice Brennan in four, and Justice Harlan in the state cases.4A2
Having considered briefly the judicial history of obscenity, let us
now observe another major factor in the development of the law of
obscenity-the Model Penal Code.43 Although the Model Penal Code
was not directly involved in Roth, all the Justices appear nevertheless
to have been influenced in their thinking by the Code, and it is cited
in three of the four opinions. The Code states, "It is our purpose in
Section 207.10 to draft a modem law of obscenity, conforming to the
general penal norms of the Model Code, and taking into account
changes of circumstances and knowledge since the time when the
prevailing law of obscenity took shape."
44
The American Law Institute de'ned obscenity as:
(2) Obscene Defined; Method of Adjudication. A thing is obscene
if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest,
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even if the obscenity
is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs. Obscenity shall be
judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it shall be judged
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value, emphasizing that the
three elements must coalesce, and that no such material can be pro-
scribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418-419. Id. at 770-71.
40 Id. at 771.
41Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 456 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S.
453 (1967); Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Rosen-
bloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S.
449 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday
v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446
(1967); Shepard v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Bather v. California, 388
U.S. 443 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keneg v. New
York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967).42 Note, The Substantive Law of Obscenity: An Adventure in Quicksand, 13
N.Y.L.F. 81, 126 (1967).
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1956).
44 MoD.L PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1956).
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with reference to children or other specially susceptible audience if
it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of
its dissemination to be specially designed for or directed to such an
audience. In any prosecution for an offense under this section evidence
shall be admissible to show:
(a) the character of the audience for which the material was
designed or to which it was directed;
(b) what the predominant appeal of the material would be for
ordinary adults or a special audience, and what effect, if any,
it would probably have on behavior of such people;
(c) artistic, literary, scientific, educational or other merits of the
material;
(d) the degree of public acceptance of the material in this
country;
(e) appeal to prurient interest, or absence thereof, in adver-
tising or other promotion of the material;
[(f) purpose and reputation of the author, publisher or dis-
seminator.]
Expert testimony and testimony of the author, creator or publisher re-
lating to factors entering into the determination of the issue of obscenity
shall be admissible.4 5
Their intention was to reach the commercial panderer of literature
designed to appeal to prurient interest.46 This purpose of the Institute
has been incorporated into case law and is the basis for most of the
modem statutes, including Kentucky's.
YOUTH AND OBSCENY
You cannot ask the community to do for your child by censorship
what you have not done for him by example. Hide the world from him
and he will go into the world in ignorance.47
Our society had always assumed a special regard for youth, as do
the laws of our land.
A democratic society rests for its continuance upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints
and dangers within a broad range of selection. 48
Parents and schools have the responsibility of developing the character
of our youth. "However parental freedom of choice in training off-
spring is entitled to some measure of community protection. 49
4 5 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).4 6 MODEL P a AL CODE § 207.10, Comment (Tent Draft. No. 6 1957).
47 Ciardi, Manner of Speaking, SATuImAY REVrEw, Aug. 10, 1963, at 16.4 8 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943).
49 Kuh, Obscenity: Prosecution Problems and Legislative Suggestions, 10
CATH. L, r~v. 285, 294 (1964).
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Some authorties say obscenity does not harm the child. 0 How-
ever the majority of the evidence is contra.51 J. Edgar Hoover summed
it up when he said, 'Ve cannot afford, however, to wait for an
answer from psychiatrists as to the extent that it [obscene material]
affects the youth's mind. We do know that sex crime is associated with
pornography.f
5 2
A closer look at Kentucky's proposed statute for youth obscenity
would be appropriate here; for to this writer the recommendation re-
garding youth obscenity is the only important proposal of the Crime
Commission in this field.5 3 The most important point of this law is the
age brackets the statute would establish. "Minor" in this proposed
statute means anyone under the age of seventeen in Section 484h, and
anyone under the age of eighteen in 484i.
Is this a realistic assessment of where we should draw our line?
What about sixteen year olds who are taking advanced biology courses,
or advanced literature students-should their exposure to life be so dis-
torted until they reach the arbitrary age of seventeen? A better
classification would be to draw several age differentiations. Why not
create a special class of permissible literature for those children
from twelve to sixteen years and a different class for those sixteen to
eighteen, then leave it to the discretion of the individual. At least up
until that point they would have had guidance in their formative
years and will now be able to better select what they want to read.
Hopefully by partial exposure or at least some freedom in what they
wanted to read earlier in their life, their reading desires will be more
academically or aesthetically inclined.54
50 Dr. Tahoda in her study for American Law Institute asserts that they are
not affected. Fagan, Obscenitu Control and Minors, the Case for a Separate
Standard, 10 CATH. L. REv. 270, 275 (1964).
51 Dr. Frederic Werthan felt that children were harmed by obscene
literature, as did Dr. Benjamin Karpman, Chief Psychotherapist at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital. See F. WEamrTAN, SEDUcrION OF THE INNocmrr ch. IV (1954).
112 Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to all federal law enforcement officials, Jan.
1, 1960.
53 Its primary source is Nmv YonK PxmAL LAw §§ 484(h)-(i) (McKinney
1966). These statutes were declared constitutional in Ginsberg v. New York, 389
U.S. 965 (1968).54 Note, The Substantive Law of Obscenity: An Adventure in Quicksand,
13 N.Y.L.F. 81, 128 (1967).
It is unrealistic to draw the line at age eighteen, as is usually done.
This improperly classifies, i.e., married teenagers, biology and literature
students at the college freshman level with children at the grade school
level. This, as in the case of classfying adults with children, 'is to
burn the house to roast the pig.' If we must have child obscenity laws
there should be at least two levels of tolerance, i.e., those under twelve
and those twelve to sixteen. Those in the former group are not prospects
for the merchant of sex literature or films. They are without purchasing
(Continued on next page)
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Likewise it should also be vital that these laws do not prohibit the
cultural experience available to a child. As Judge Bok said:
It will be asked whether one would care to have one's young read
these books [i.e., God's Little Acre, the Studs Lanigan trilogy] ...
I should prefer my own three daughters meet the facts of life and the
literature of the world in my library than behind a neighbor's barn, for
I can face the adversary there directly . . . no parents who have been
discerning with their children need fear the outcome.55
Most would agree that a child should not be subjected to that with
which he cannot deal. This should be the purpose of our child ob-
scenity statute, but we must not govern our adults with a child's
standard.
RECOMMENDATION
Give your evidence,' said the King; and don't be nervous, or I'll have
you executed on the spot.
Alice in Wonderland
For the preceding reasons, this writer feels that a statute governing
the exposure of children to obscenity is a necessity. Nevertheless, for
the following reasons statutes governing adult exposure to obscenity
should be deleted from the current proposals in Kentucky.
In contrast to children, the effect of obscenity on adults is con-
jectural. Consequently, saying a work has no social value is not a
reason, but an excuse. We now live in a society which views sex in
a more candid manner than any generation before us.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
power and are uninterested in 'adult erotic games.' If they are solicited
by a 'panderer' his actions would be more tortious than commercial
and the law should provide an appropriate civil, and in the extreme case,
a criminal remedy.
Those in the latter group have acute sexual curiosity and have not
as yet assumed viable sexual identities. The state should proscribe the
soliciting of this age group by the merchant of 'hard-core pornog-
raphy' (as Justice Stewart uses the term), alluringly portraying bestiality
or other perversity-but should go no further because censorship solicits
sexual curiosity in that which is least deserving of such curiosity and
provides an unsettling example of secrecy and furtiveness towards life.
* * * *
As of those over sixteen, any attempt to hide the adult world from
them is self-defeating as it is vain.
0 * * 0
Scienter as to age should be required for the same reason that scienter
as to obscenity is required, to avoid self-censorship of constitutionally
protected material. The emphasis should be on the solicitation of the
'hard-core porongorphy' of perversity to the otherwise indifferent juvenile
before the bookseller can be imprisoned.
55 Id. at 110.
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Obscenity cannot be measured as a crime, but only a sin. Likewise
a sin is a very subjective standard and not amenable to legal sanction.56
The utter ridiculousness of obscenity legislation was summed up as
follows:
Additionally, censorship spawns its own particular evils: timidity;
cynicism; unwarranted curiosity. It stiffles expression that may be
therapeutic. Furthermore, it is self-defeating. The 'big business of
pornography' thrives on the very laws that impede its supply and
increase the demand. Experience has shown that the word 'censored'
is more profitable to the pornographer than the content of his material.
There is no rational regulation for an irrational phenomenon. The
best regulation is self-regulation. The applause or rejection of the audi-
ence will always be the ultimate censor, no matter what the state of the
law. The great courage of the Supreme Court has faltered in the ob-
scenity cases, save for the clear and thoroughly adult opinions of Justices
Douglas and Black. Both Justices have emphasized that the choice of
what to read is an individual and not a governmental choice. The choice
is admittedly difficult but unavoidably personal and it is high-time that
we stop imprisoning men for selling books, and lift the distasteful task
of the censor from the Court, and from government, and make our
own decisions as to what we are to read, to see, and to think.57
One should be free to choose his own reading material. Questions
should not concern the nature of the material, but why some people
read only pornography. One should be permitted to live his adult life
with all its risks, including those involving sexuality and obscenity.
The legislature should refrain from removing by law the natural right
of presumptively rational adults to accept these risks and choose for
themselves what they desire to read. The point was best summarized
three hundred years ago by John Milton in his Areopagitica. Here
he enunciated the eternal case against censorship: "For those actions
which enter into a man rather than issue out of him, Cod uses not to
captivate under a general prescription, but trusts him with the gift of
reason to be his own chooser."58 (Emphasis added.)
Thomas B. Russell
ClUm-TAL LAw-CoNsENSUAL HomosexuAL BEHAvioR-Tim NED
FoR LEGISLA=vE i EFon.-One has only to explore the pages of Ken-
tucky legal history to find that before 1962 the statutory prohibition
against sodomy was one of the untouched areas of Kentucky criminal
law. The Penal Act of 1778 prescribed a two to five year penalty for
56 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. Rtv. 691 (1963).
57 Note, supra note 54, at 132.
Us Gilman, supra note 5, at 82.
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